Tuesday, 28 February 2012



Beer Advertising?
The court in JTI MacDonald suggests that profit driven commercial speech is of low value. What if the government were to ban lifestyle advertising for beer companies?
Section 2b would most likely found to be violated, as a ban on advertising has been consistently held to infringe freedom of expression, even if the speech is profit driven and commercial.
Pressing and Substantial Objective: This would depend on the ability of the government to show a significant injury to the health of Canadians. Consideration should be given to the fact that alcohol can form crippling addictions, present health care costs involving alcohol related diseases, impaired driving,  and others. While not uncontroversial, a case could be made for a pressing, substantial concern.
Rational Connection: This would most likely be made out, given that in advertising cases, the connection between consumption and advertising is evidenced by the fact that companies have been spending large amounts on television and other media advertisements.
Minimal Impairment: A blanket prohibition on advertising was a serious concern in RJR, where JTI validated the distinction between lifestyle advertising and blanket prohibition to a degree sufficient to state that the impairment was minimal. Again, the government is not required to choose the best option, but merely one of a range of reasonable choices.

Proporitonality: Sorry, ran out of time. What do you think?

RJR and JTI



RJR and JTI

RJR
·      Tobacco advertising was prohibited by legislation, very broadly
·      Tobacco company challenged the legislation and it was found to be in violation of s. 2(b)
·      The majority could not justify the limit because the legislation was too broad
·      The dissent, written by La Forest, would have upheld the legislation because the health of Canadians was found to be important enough that the response was proportionate
·      The dissent pointed out that there was no political, scientific or artistic ends to tobacco advertising; equated this type of advertising to advertising prostitution, hate mongering, or pornography

How do you feel about this decision?
Most of our group felt that they would favour the decision of the majority in this case. At the same time, found that the dissent raised valid points, in that the dissent favoured the protection of vulnerable people the advertising was aimed it.

Why was parliament more stringent in this case than in other cases, for example, Irwin Toy?
·      Perhaps they were making an example of poor drafting on a major issue.
·      Perhaps because of McLachlin’s interest in free speech

JTI [2007]
·      Companies brought similar action on bans by governments
·      Found to all infringe s. 2(b)
·      But upheld under s. 1 in this case
·      Passes on the minimal impairment branch of s. 1 because of specific schematic structures
·      Distinguish this case from RJR by evidence that has been presented
·      There was a broader understanding internationally about the risks of health risks caused by smoking

What would explain the differences in the Court’s approach in these two cases?
·      Perhaps been a shift in the 12 years between the two cases in understanding of the health risks of tobacco companies. The rising concern of how much Canadians will pay for health care.
·      There were more provincial bans in place by 2007, which suggests that there was a general shift in society towards valuing smoke-free environments
·      Part of the violation in RJR was forcing the company to give warnings that were not part of their own expression
·      In JTI those warnings were coming straight from the mouth of Health Canada

RJR MacDonald & JTI MacDonald

First, LaForest's dissent in RJR MacDonald is problematic. We agree with the general principles of the reasoning, but his formulation of the proper test for s.1 (pg. 989) is too much a departure from the stringent, established Oakes Test. He says that an infringement can be justified so long as it is reasonable and demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society. Although these are the exact words of section 1 of the Charter, he is basically requesting an abandonment of the Oakes test.

Second, the transition between these two cases saw the dialogue between the courts and parliament become more deferential. Parliament deferred more to parliament in RJR than it did in JTI. Parliament's response to RJR, in the form of the Tabacco Act  and the Tobacco Products Information Regulation, prompted the courts to respond to parliamentary efforts. The goal of the courts was, as always, to maintain the legitimacy of the judiciary by deferring to the elected legislature.

The timing between cases suggests that society, in general, gained more and more appreciation that smoking is harmful, and thus became more and more condemned.  For example, in 1995 people were still smoking in restaurants and bars. Eventually, these establishments had non-smoking sections, followed by smoking sections being glassed in, having to go outside to smoke, smoking on patios only, culminating in no smoking whatsoever.

We are concerned about the level of deference to parliament in in JTI-MacDonald because the infringement is arbitrary. Why cigarettes? Because they're harmful. Why not alcohol? Alcohol can be extremely harmful, yet the warnings are not nearly as explicit or prevalent. Similarly, commercials produced for the benefit of fast food establishments can be directed at children and depict happy families surrounded by bright, primary colours.

Tuesday, 7 February 2012


A Criticism of the Sunday Observance Cases
Big M (top of p 844): It is undoubtedly true that both [religious and secular elements] may be present in any given enactment, indeed it is almost inevitable that they will be, considering that such laws combine a prohibition of ordinary employment for one day out of seven with a specification  that this day of rest shall be the Christian Sabbath- Sunday.
Edwards (p853): One is not being compelled to engage in religious practices merely because a statutory obligation coincides with the dictates of a particular religion. I cannot accept for example, that [prohibiting murder] is a state enforced compulsion to conform to religious practices.

Big M Drugmart



Facts

Big M Drugmart was charged with unlawfully carrying on the sale of goods contrary to the lords day act.
This act made it an offence for anyone to engage in or carry on business on Sunday.

Issues

Does the Lord’s Day Act violate the constitutional freedom of religion?  If so, is the legislation justifiable under s.1 of the Charter?

Holding

Lord’s Day Act was declared to be of no force or effect.

Reasoning

First step in the constitutional challenge is to determine purpose and effect of legislation.
Initial test examines purpose and if the law passes the purpose test then the effect of the legislation are examined.

In this instance the purpose of this legislation is compulsion of sabbatical observance.  Therefore the act offends freedom of religion and is unnecessary to consider the actual effect.

The Lord’s Day Act gives the appearance of discrimination against non Christian Canadians, as such non Christians are not permitted to carry out otherwise lawful activities. Therefore any law deemed religious in purpose which denies non Christians a lawful right infringes on their freedom.

The government may not coerce individuals to affirm a specific religious belief or manifest a religious practice even for a sectarian purpose.  The Charter prevents the government compelling individuals to perform or abstain from otherwise harmless acts because of the religious significance of others.



Under the analysis of Section 1 , the arguments are practical as everyone needs a day of rest but this does not save the legislation as legislation cannot be saved by effect alone. The practical effect of the legislation is not the purpose of the legislation and as such, cannot save the legislation.

Intro to Freedom of Religion (Group 2)


Introduction to Freedom of Religion (p. 837-842)

Important Questions
How are the pre-Charter Constitution and the Charter related?
How is the purpose and effect of legislation determined in Charter analysis? Does legislative purpose stay the same or change as society changes over time?
What is the scope and nature of the s 2(a) right to freedom of religion?
To what extent does the Charter allow religiously-derived values of society to be encapsulated in legislation?

Relevant Charter provisions
Section 2(a) text states that “everyone has the following fundamental freedoms – freedom of conscience and religion”. In s. 15, the Charter’s equality provision, it is provided that the state cannot discriminate on the basis of religion. However, s. 15(2) provides that it is not contrary to the guarantees set out in s 15(1) for the government to improve conditions of disadvantaged individuals or groups, and 15(2) includes mention of those disadvantaged due to religion.
Relevant interpretative provisions to s 2(a) include the preamble to the Constitution, “Whereas Canada is founded upon principles that recognize supremacy of God and rule of law”, and s. 27, which requires that Charter interpretation be “consistent with the multicultural heritage of Canadians”.

Contrasting Approaches to Freedom of Religion
Religious freedom consists of 2 basic ideas:
(1)   Establishment of religion
a.       The state cannot exercise its power to impose the state’s preferred religion on individuals or on groups in the general population. This establishment could be done in a concrete or symbolic way.
(2)   Protection of “free exercise” of religion
a.       Emphasis is given to individual/group religious practices and stipulates that it is inappropriate for state to interfere with religious belief or practice. This idea usually involves adherents of minority religions, and it is common for the interference to arise as the result of laws that had no such purpose but which nonetheless have the effect of impeding on free exercise of religion.

By its guarantee of freedom of conscience and religion, section 2(a) appears to offer protection not only to the free exercise of theocentric beliefs and practices, subject to justifiable limitations, but also to non-theistic system of belief and morality. This is in keeping with provisions in other human rights documents which recognize and affirm freedom of thought and conscience together with a guarantee of religious freedom. These ideas are captures in s 2(b) which protects freedom of “thought, belief and opinion” as well as freedom of expression.

The early cases on religious freedom produced a dramatic reduction in the religious framing of life in Canada that coincided with general societal trends. The SCC was also more confident in its role as guardian of the constitutional order, including “large and liberal” rights protection, and more strict in its analysis of justifiable limits on rights under s 1 in the early cases.

Sunday, 5 February 2012

Freedom of Religion: Introduction


Freedom of Religion: Introduction

(Pages 837 – 842)

Religion is an important element in understanding and applying the Canadian Constitution, as evidenced by sections 2(a) and 15, which both make direct references to rights related to religion.

2. Everyone has the following fundamental freedoms:
(a) freedom of conscience and religion;


15. (1) Every individual is equal before and under the law and has the right to the equal protection and equal benefit of the law without discrimination and, in particular, without discrimination based on race, national or ethnic origin, colour, religion, sex, age or mental or physical disability.

(2) Subsection (1) does not preclude any law, program or activity that has as its object the amelioration of conditions of disadvantaged individuals or groups including those that are disadvantaged because of race, national or ethnic origin, colour, religion, sex, age or mental or physical disability.


These sections were written in a spirit of compromise between groups wanting a broader drafting, and others, such as the federal Conservative Party, who proposed a more spiritually proscriptive s.1, which would only validate freedoms that were “founded on a respect for moral and spiritual values and the rule of law.”

Furthermore, there are two interpretive provisions that are relevant to the subject of religion under the Charter. These are the preamble, which states “Whereas Canada is founded upon principles that recognize the supremacy of God and the rule of law”, and s. 27, which mandates Charter interpretation be “consistent with the multicultural heritage of Canadians.”

Religious freedom consists of two basic ideas. The first is that the State cannot exercise its power to impose its preferred religion on individuals or groups or the “establishment” of religion. The second is that it is inappropriate for the State to interfere with religious beliefs or practices. This is referred to as the protection of “free exercise” of religion.

The general question raised by the issue of freedom of religion is the relationship that exists between religion and the law in Canada and how the Constitution affects this relationship.

Often, when Charter issues arise, the problem is finding a balance between the impermissible establishment of religion and the interference with the free exercise of religion.  This often forces courts to define the place of religion in Canadian society, which is a difficult, if not impossible, task.

The guarantee of “freedom of conscious and religion” appears to give protection for not only theocentric beliefs and practices, but also to non-theistic systems of belief and morality. This leads to certain questions: Can the state privilege religion over non-religion? And do claims to the free exercise of religion have a higher constitutional status than claims to be free of religion altogether?

In asking these questions, a number of claims related to freedom of religion can be identified. Some include:
  • Accommodation claims of religious minorities when general rules make it difficult for them to live according to their sincerely held religious obligations
  •  Claims by secular individuals who seek to be free from state-imposed religious practices
  •  Religious communities who seek protection by way of exemption or accommodation to facilitate their particular way of life
  •  Individuals whose commitment to a religious community may not include the community’s full range of beliefs or practices

A final issue to be addressed is whether individuals can use Canadian law to secure protection of interests that have purely religious significance. This debate gives rise to the concern that Canadian law should not become a tool of religious oppression.


Canadian Constitutional Law, 4th ed., pg. 837-842