Eldridge v. British Columbia (Attorney General) pg 816

Eldridge v. British Columbia (Attorney General) pg 816

Facts

Three individuals who were born deaf preferred to communicate in sign language and went to court for a declaration that the failure to provide sign language interpreters when receiving medical assistance violated s.15 of the Charter.

The medical services Commission were responsible for deciding which services were provided to patients and deemed this service unnecessary.

The two relevant sections of the Charter for this case are:

15.

(1) Every individual is equal before and under the law and has the right to the equal protection and equal benefit of the law without discrimination and, in particular, without discrimination based on race, national or ethnic origin, colour, religion, sex, age or mental or physical disability.

Affirmative action programs

(2) Subsection (1) does not preclude any law, program or activity that has as its object the amelioration of conditions of disadvantaged individuals or groups including those that are disadvantaged because of race, national or ethnic origin, colour, religion, sex, age or mental or physical disability.

32.(1)  This Charter applies

(a)  to the Parliament and government of Canada in respect of all matters within the authority of Parliament including all matters relating to the Yukon Territory and Northwest Territories; and

(b)  to the legislature and government of each province in respect of all matters within the authority of the legislature of each province.

In the judgment for this case, La Forest J. outlines the types of non-government entities to which the Charter will apply under s. 32. Entities, such as crown corporation, over which the government imposes direct control will be deemed “government” for the purposes of s. 32 of the Charter. Sometimes, however, governments will utilize entities which are private in nature to implement a particular provision of government policies. These entities are not considered “government” for the purposes of s. 32 of the Charter. However, the Court points out that this finding could function as a mechanism for government to evade its Charter responsibilities by delegating policy implementation to third parties. As such, the Court holds that any entity, in performing a particular government action, are held to be operating under s. 32 in so far as that particular governmental action is concerned.

As such, while the Court held that hospitals are not “government” for s. 32 of the Charter, they are performing an government action when implementing government policies. Thus, s. 32 applies and, by extention, so does s. 15.